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INTRODUCTION 
The formation of ECOWAS in 1975 should be seen as the culmination of 
several attempts over a period of one and half decades to form a sub-regional 
organisation embracing the whole of West Africa. Initial attempts had 
floundered first, as a result of the rivalry between Ghana (under Kwame 
Nkrumah) and Nigeria (under Tafawa Balewa) in the early 1960s and later, the 
struggle for supremacy in the sub-region between Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire 
along Anglophone-Francophone lines. The events that delayed the formation 
have been well documented by O. Aluko, AKD Frempong, O.A. Obasanjo and 
O.J.B. Ojo.1 
Against this background it seemed reasonable that none of the sixty-five 
articles of the original ECOWAS Treaty alluded to sub-regional security and/or 
defence.  The founding fathers were not in a hurry to include any political issues 
that might be interpreted as a violation of member-states’ sovereignty or a 
threat to their national security (Frempong 1999:124).2  But the implications of 
peace as a prerequisite for regional economic development would soon dawn on 
ECOWAS leaders and force them to take the first step towards a conflict 
management system in 1978. More significantly, the demons of intra-community 
rivalries along the Anglo-Francophone cleavage will rear their ugly heads from 
time to time to frustrate ECOWAS’ efforts at conflict management in the post-
Cold War era.3 
ECOWAS was founded on 28th May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria with the 
signing of the ECOWAS Treaty. Established as an economic union, ECOWAS was 
designed to integrate the economies of its 15 member states of  Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo in order to promote 
 
1 Aluko. Ghana and Nigeria: A Study in Inter African Discord , 1976;  Frempong ,“A Sub-Regional Approach to Conflict 
resolution in Africa: The Case of Ecowas and the Liberian Peace Process, 1999”, p121;. Obasanjo, My Command: An 
Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1980, p155 : Ojo, “Nigerian and the Formation of ECOWAS,” 1980, pp571-604. 
2 Frempong, p124 
3 Frempong, p136 
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economic growth and development within the West African sub region. The idea 
was influenced by the trends in globalization and international economic 
relations of the twentieth century. 
 The organization has made notable achievements towards the attainment 
of its objectives. However, the realization that the goal of regional economic 
cooperation cannot be fully achieved without peace and stability led to the 
adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) and the Protocol Relating to 
the Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD). 
 
EVOLUTION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OF ECOWAS 
MEMBERS 
Convinced that economic progress could not be achieved unless the 
conditions for security were assured in all member states of the Community, the 
ECOWAS member states signed the Protocol of Non-Aggression (PNA) in Lagos 
on 22 April 1978. 4 The adoption of the PNA was intended to create a friendly 
atmosphere, free from any fear of attack or aggression of one state by another. In 
its preamble, ECOWAS leaders admitted that the Community “cannot attain its 
objective except in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding.”5 
  While the PNA had the advantage of creating a friendly atmosphere and 
generating trust among members, the Protocol, however, overlooked the issues 
of the incidence of aggression from non-member States and externally 
supported domestic insurrection within the region. To cater for this inadequacy, 
the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) came into being 
in 1981.6  Articles 2 and 3 of PMAD adopted the principles of collective security 
and collective defence, respectively. In Article 2, any armed threat or aggression 
against any member-state was to be considered as one against the entire 
community; and Article 3 required member-states to give mutual aid and 
assistance to members so affected.  
Furthermore, the PMAD provided that units from the armies of ECOWAS 
countries would constitute Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) only 
when needed in an emergency. It, therefore, did not create a permanent 
 
4 ECOWAS Secretariat “Protocol on Non-Aggression, (PNA)” 1978; M.Ayoob “Sqarring the Circles: Collective Security 
Systens of State,” in TG Weiss(ed) Security in a Changing World, 1993, p48 
5 ECOWAS Secretariat “Protocol on Non-Aggression, (PNA)” 1978; M.Ayoob “Sqarring the Circles: Collective Security 
Systens of State,” in TG Weiss(ed) Security in a Changing World, 1993, p48 
6 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism  for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,      Peacekeeping 
and Security, PMAD Article 13, Abuja, 1999, pp 7-17.  
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ECOWAS standing army. This would mean that when the time came for ECOWAS 
to enter Liberia for example, unlike NATO, there would be no stand-by units and 
ECOMOG would have to rely on personnel contributed on a voluntary basis by 
some member-states.7 
The AAFC, which could carry out joint military exercises, was to be under 
the command of a Force Commander appointed by the ECOWAS Authority and 
together with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the affected state; he was to 
implement the decisions of the Authority. The actions of the Force Commander 
were to be subject to the competent authority of member–state(s) concerned.8  
This last provision could be easily applied in situations of external threat 
against a member-state. But in the case of an internal conflict in a failed state (as 
was the case in Liberia) the provision would create problems, since there would 
be no competent political authority - a dilemma that was confronted by the first 
ECOMOG command in Liberia.9 
On paper, the PMAD made a giant leap in ECOWAS’ preparedness for 
conflict management, but that protocol was allowed to be infested by the virus of 
non-implementation; but for Liberia, it surely would have remained a dead 
letter. By 1990, the deputy executive secretary had not been appointed, member 
states had not earmarked units to the AAFC for joint operations to take place 
and none of the institutions created was fully operational.    
However, the very existence of the PNA and PMAD provided some legal 
basis for ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia. At least, the two protocols together 
were a testimony to the fact that ECOWAS was not a purely economic 
integration outfit which could not assume responsibility for sub-regional conflict 
management. 
The 1981 PMAD provided the outlines for dealing with internal armed 
conflicts if they were engineered and actively supported by other actors in the 
region. The Protocol, however, did not make provision for any intervention in 
case of a purely internal conflict. Fifteen years after the formation of ECOWAS, 
the Community was confronted with its major security challenge: the 1989 
Liberian Civil War. ECOWAS established ECOMOG to control the conflict, and 
justified its intervention on the basis of four interrelated factors, namely: 
 
7 Frempong op cit, p 125 
8 Frempong Ibid 
9 Frempong Ibid 
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humanitarian; the provisions of the PMAD; regional security; and response to 
the request of the then government in Liberia. 
The failure to implement the provisions of the PMAD meant that when 
Liberia and subsequently, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau were flung upon 
ECOWAS, it had to improvise in many respects, resorting to ad hoc institutions 
whose activities would be characterised by disjointed actions.  ECOWAS at its 
13th Summit held late May 1990 in Banjul, Gambia, formed a five-member 
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to mediate in conflicts within the sub-
region which could have a disruptive impact on the normal life within member 
states and the smooth functioning of the Community (ECOWAS Decision 
A/Dec/9/90). The initial members were Gambia (chair), Ghana, Nigeria, Mali 
and Togo. 
The creation of the SMC had some interesting dimensions; coming as it 
were almost a decade after the adoption of the comprehensive PMAD indicated 
that the 1981 pact had become moribund. The SMC was not created specifically 
as a curative measure for the Liberian crisis but there is no doubt that   its 
formation was influenced by the then six-month old war in that country. In fact, 
Liberia became the SMC’s first and only patient.  The SMC was charged 
apparently with purely mediatory role and this was why its decision to 
intervene in Liberia would prove quite controversial.10  Lastly, and of more 
relevance to the later dynamics of the ECOWAS conflict management system was 
that the SMC was initiated by the then Nigerian head of state, Ibrahim 
Babaginda,  the closest associate of the Doe regime in Liberia’  who later became 
the chief advocate of the ECOMOG intervention; while the decision was signed 
on behalf of ECOWAS by the Burkinabe president, Blaise Campaore, then out-
going ECOWAS chairman, a known supporter of Taylor’s NPFL and 11perhaps the 
staunchest critic of the ECOMOG idea. 
ECOMOG the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire 
Monitoring Group is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea, and air 
components that were set up by ECOWAS member states to deal with the 
insecurity that followed the collapse of the state structure in the Republic of 
Liberia in 1990.12  The force restored security that permitted the reinstatement 
 
10 Report of ECOWAS Workshop. Koffi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra, Ghana, 2005 
11 Vogt, SMC crafted the ECOWAS Peace Plan (EPP), which became the bases for its intervention. It called for the 
formation of ECOMOG which was heavily criticized by especially the Francophone block,CoteDivoire and Burkina Fasso 
who were the stauch supporters of NPFL; 1992. 
12 Frempong op. cit  pp 140, 268. 
5 
of a functional state structure in Liberia.13 ECOMOG has since controlled conflicts 
in West Africa, notably in Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1999), Guinea-
Liberia border (2001), and for a second time in Liberia (2003). 
However, the fact that ECOMOG operation were set up largely by military 
governments, and were run almost entirely by the military led to some major 
difficulties for the force’s operations.14  In the first Liberian conflict, for instance, 
there was little public understanding of the ECOMOG’s mandate; the force 
received much bad press while the rebels effectively utilized international media 
to undermine ECOMOG’s achievements. The forces also faced the problem of 
command and control, and inter-contingent differences in terms of language, 
training, capability, and equipment. Above all, the lack of clear consensus among 
the region’s political leaders about the role and mandate of the force was the 
main problem of ECOMOG. Some Member States have allegedly supported rebel 
groups against ECOMOG, as was the case in Liberia. This severely undermined 
the force’s effectiveness, and splintered ECOWAS itself.  
Important lessons were drawn from these early ECOMOG experiences. 
West African leaders became more conscious of the fact that good governance 
and sustainable development are essential for peace and conflict prevention. 
Member-states therefore “undertake to cooperate with the Community in 
establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely 
prevention and resolution of intra- and inter-state conflicts and the need to 
establish a regional peace and security system and peacekeeping forces where 
appropriate”.15   This formed the basis for the adoption of the Protocol Relating 
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
keeping and Security (ECOWAS Mechanism for short) in December 1999, 
following a series of ECOWAS meetings beginning with the extra-ordinary 
summit in December 1997. Its preamble not only affirms the desire of the 
leaders to consolidate the achievements in the resolution of conflicts through 
ECOMOG, but also to establish an operational structure for its implementation.16 
As the long name indicates, the twelve-point objectives of the Mechanism 
include  preventing, managing and resolving internal and inter-state conflicts; 
strengthening cooperation in early warning, peace-keeping, the control of cross-
 
13 M Khobe, “The Evolution and Conduct of ECOWAS Operations in West Africa” in Monograph 44 
14 The democratic credentials  of the SMC came under critic. Babangida (Nigeria(),Rawlings (Ghana) and 
lansanaConteh (Gambia) assumed power through coups. Momohs (Sierra Leones) and Jawara (Gambia) were 
presidents of one party states. See West Africa, August-September, 2002,p10. 
15 ECOWAS Protocol, op cit p2-4.; Freempong “Crisis of Post Conflict Building: The Liberian Experience, 2003. 
16 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
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border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms, etc. They 
also include maintaining and consolidating peace, security and stability within 
the Community, the organisation and coordination of humanitarian relief and 
constituting and deploying a civilian and military force whenever the need 
arises.17 
  At least on paper, this represents a very comprehensive attempt to 
overcome the sub-region’s security problems in the broadest of terms as it takes 
into consideration all aspects of the security challenges expected within West 
Africa. The seventh mechanism, Task-sharing   provided that In the pursuit of its 
objectives, ECOWAS shall cooperate with the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), the United Nations Organisation (UN) and other relevant international 
organisations.18  Lastly, the new modes of funding ECOWAS PSO will apparently 
relieve civilian and troop-contributors from bearing the full financial burden of 
their involvement which in the past had been a serious disincentive for 
personnel contribution. 
 
THE ECOWAS STANDBY FORCE (ESF) 
Even though the Protocol establishing the ECOWAS Standby Force had 
been signed by ECOWAS member states in 1999, the force was yet to be 
assembled by the time the 2003 Liberian conflict broke out. ECOWAS still relied 
on the ad hoc assembly of troops from member states, placed under ECOMOG, to 
control both the Guinea-Liberian border conflict, and the second Liberian 
conflict in 2001 and 2003 respectively.  Apart from the ECOMOG operation in 
Guinea-Bissau, ECOMOG’s exit strategy has been to transition its troops to a 
subsequent UN peacekeeping force. Its modus operandi has involved an initial 
emergency response, followed by the deployment of a multifunctional UN 
mission. ECOMOG operations have usually been stop-gap measures predicated 
on the UN eventually taking over the lead.19 
    It was in this context that the idea of the ESF which would be an integrated 
force undergoing joint training, with quotas set for each member state was born.    
ECOWAS member states signed a protocol in 1999 that called for the 
establishment of a military force known as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF).   
 
17 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
18 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
19 W. Durch (ed), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St Martins Press, 1993) p9. 
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The ESF is to correct some of the problems ECOMOG had in both its organisation 
and operations.  
The ESF is designed to meet the security needs of the sub-region and 
relates to a broader ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention, management, 
resolution, peacekeeping, and security.  ESF is to be employed when there are 
breaches of the peace due to conflict between two or more member states, 
violations of human rights and rule of law, and the overthrow or attempted 
overthrow of elected governments. Motivation for the adoption of the agreement 
to establish the ESF was based on ECOWAS’s success in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
in 1990s. 
The Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted by ECOWAS in 
1999, can be regarded as the Organization’s constitution on collective security in 
the West African sub-region. The document provides the legal foundation for 
ECOWAS to deal with security issues affecting the sub region. The new Protocol 
signed in 1999, in many regards marks a departure from the traditional 
principle of non-intervention as the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to intervene in 
the internal conflicts of member states. It is noteworthy that the Protocol 
emerged in the aftermath of ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
This is the first time that an international organization has formerly codified the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention as well as legalizing the use of force to 
restore or prevent the overthrow of a democratically elected government.20 
The difficulty of force mobilization and the need for prompt action in 
dealing with conflicts and emergencies were some of the lessons learnt from 
past ECOWAS missions. The Organization therefore adopted a standby collective 
security arrangement for rapid deployment in trouble spots around the sub 
region. The ECOWAS military vision, anchored on the need to build and maintain 
a standby regional military capability, provides a clear direction for ECOWAS 
senior military commanders to develop a multi-national force capable of 
meeting the security needs of the sub-region. “The ECOWAS military component 
will be comprised of pre-determined regional standby formations that are highly 
trained, equipped, and prepared to deploy as directed in response to a crises or 
threat to peace and security.”   To meet the force structure, as laid out in the 
 
20 Report of ECOWAS Workshop,op cit. 
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ECOWAS Standby Units: Proposed Concept and Structure, ESF is to be composed 
of a Task Force (TF) and a Main Brigade (MB). 21 
The TF will comprise of 1,646 soldiers within pre-determined units 
located within member states, and upon order, deploy into any mission within 
30 days and be fully self-sustaining for 90 days.   Should the situation warrant an 
increase in the size of the peacekeeping force, the TF will be reinforced by the 
MB.   The MB will comprise of 5,028, additional peacekeepers, which will be 
located within predetermined units and upon order be prepared to deploy 
within 90 days and be fully self-sustaining for 90 days. This brings the total 
strength of the ESF to 6,674 troops.22  The MB force structure is based on the 
operational concept that the initial ECOWAS TF has been rapidly deployed and 
that a more robust, long- term force is required.    The overarching assumption is 
that when needed, the MB will have advance warning, be able to review the 
actual conditions of the battlefield as experienced by the TF, and then prepare, 
assemble, and deploy. 
 It is important to note that the MB is not a completely separate, stand-
alone unit as contrasted to the TF.    Instead, the MB is an objective, mission-
oriented means of expanding the previously deployed TF into a more robust 
military organization based on actual needs.    During actual employment in the 
field, the MB will have significant capability to conduct peace-building and 
humanitarian assistance operations in accordance with the mission mandate.  
The task force will comprise command, staff, operational units and logistics 
elements, which will provide all the supplies and materials required by the TF.23   
The TF is headed by the Force Commander (FC) who has Operational 
Command (OPCOM) of the ESF. He is assisted by a Deputy Force Commander 
(DFC) who also doubles as the Chief Military Observer (CMO). The CMO 
commands all Military Observers (MO) deployed in the mission.  The Chief of 
Staff (COS) heads the team of TF Staff organized into seven cells (JI, J2, J3/J5, J4, 
J6, J8, and J9). The main task force is made up of a Mechanized Infantry Battalion 
(762 Men), Helicopter Squadron (45 Men), Logistics Battalion (648 Men) and a 
Civilian Police Unit (81 Police Men). The FC also has a team of advisers, which 
provide planning advice.24 
 
21 ECOWAS Protocol, op cit. 
22 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
23 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
24 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
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Conceptually, the ECOWAS Task Force is based on the operational 
requirement to mobilize units in order to rapidly deploy into operations with 
the objective of enforcing peace. Based on this assumption, there are limited 
consideration and provision in the TF for peace-building or humanitarian 
assistance mission. If the need arises, the TF will be expanded into the MB, 
which is capable of performing humanitarian operations. The FC is assisted by a 
team of specialist advisers covering Legal Affairs, Media, Civilian Police, Medical, 
Aviation Safety and a Provost Marshall.   A TF Headquarters Camp Management 
Unit is incorporated in order to provide security for the Headquarters. 
The line elements comprise the main operational elements of the TF.   A 
motorized Battalion consisting of five Motorized Companies with 128 personnel 
each provides the main peacekeeping force. The Battalion has a Combat Service 
Support (CSS) Company that provides all the needed supplies for the Battalion.25  
Civilian Police (CIVPOL) are a crucial element in modern Peace keeping 
operations. They are often required for the maintenance of law and order 
especially in a collapsed state scenario, when local state police are unable to 
perform their duties.   Accordingly, a CIVPOL Company comprising three Police 
platoons (20 personnel each), a Body Guard and Support Platoon make up the 
CIVPOL elements of the TF.  A Squadron of helicopters, with a maintenance unit 
is provided for the TF. This will be utilized for reconnaissance, firepower, 
logistics lift, and medical evacuation (MEDVAC) during operations.26 
  It is important to note that the sub-organization of the logistics element 
have as a primary task to provide almost all levels of supplies, services and 
direct support to the combat element. In general, the logistics unit is self-
sustainable; however, the line elements do provide the logistics element some 
security and aviation support. As the Figure indicates, the logistics elements 
include Engineer Squadron (108 troops), Medical (50 personnel), Signal 
Squadron (96 operators), Maintenance Squadron (135 personnel), Transport 
Company (110 Personnel), and a Supply and Services Unit staffed with 23 
Personnel.27 
The advantage of the structure of the TF is that it is designed as a baseline 
structure, which allows for rapid mobilization and deployment and makes it 
flexible for expansion. The TF is mobilized and deployed to conduct 
peacekeeping/enforcement operations. Should the need arise, the force is 
 
25 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
26 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
27 ECOWAS Protocol, Ibid. 
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progressively and systematically expanded into a fully-fledged Brigade capable 
of conducting peace-building and humanitarian mission and sustained 
operations for a longer duration.  
Compared with the structure of the TF, the MB with a proposed strength 
of 5,102 troops is a more robust and larger force. The Brigade is developed by 
expanding the TF with additional troops. This would include staff officers, 
combat units (line elements) and logistics units. As the TF gradually expands 
into the MB, there is a requirement for a larger staff to manage the operations. 
The headquarters is therefore expanded to cater for this requirement. The 
inclusion of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other Agencies under 
J9 is required in order to coordinate the activities of humanitarian agencies and 
NGOs.28 
 
CHALLENGES CONFRONTING ECOWAS STANDBY FORCE (ESF)  
A number of challenges ranging from operational, logistical, financial, legal and 
institutional as well as lack of political will of member states have been 
identified to be militating against the effectiveness and responsiveness of the 
ESF.   These challenges have ensured that the concept of the ESF have remained 
on the drawing board.  
 
1 OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
The ESF is critically handicapped in its intervention efforts by the lack of 
standardization in doctrine, staff procedures and training of troops. This is 
because individual Armed Forces within the sub region adopted doctrines and 
staff procedures from their colonial master (English and French) whilst other 
have adopted doctrines from the East (Russia and China). This lack of 
standardization has affected interoperability within the Force thereby 
undermining its cohesion and effectiveness.    
ECOWAS is limited in its ability to mobilize adequate personnel to respond 
timely to emerging conflict situations, though the Defence and Security 
Commission envisaged raising 6500 troops since 2005.  For the ESF to function 
effectively, ECOWAS should take steps to improve and harmonize the training of 
 
28  A Toure, The Role of Civil Society in National Reconciliation and Peace Building in Liberia, International Peace 
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member states’ troops meant for the ESF.   The 3 centres in the sub-region 
meant to serve as training institutes for military staff, the Koulikoro 
Peacekeeping Training Centre in Mali, the Kofi Annan International Peace Centre 
(KAIPTC) in Ghana and the Nigerian War College should develop curricula to 
harmonise doctrine, staff procedure and training for the ESF.   
ECOWAS should create a department for Validation, standardisation and 
evaluation to monitor and cater for training standardization and evaluation of all 
troops serving in the ESF. Additionally, efforts should be made at mobilizing 
personnel at the required levels to meet operational demands. 
In April 2008, China and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and 
Development (EBID) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to 
establish Markets in China and the ECOWAS Region that will enable their 
citizens to exploit trade and investment opportunities in their two areas.29 West 
African governments are regular buyers of Chinese weapons and military 
equipment. China recently reaffirmed its intention to strengthen military 
collaboration and exchanges with Nigeria, Liberia, and other African countries. 
In a bid to further its escalating influence in Africa, it is highly probable that 
China will provide ECOWAS with the much needed assistance by providing 
equipment, logistics support, and funding for ESF operations. Some African 
leaders oppose the establishment of U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) in Africa, 
on the basis that it negates Africa’s collective security arrangements, and rather 
request for direct funding of such existing security initiatives.30  In the wake of 
China’s continued challenges to America’s interests in Africa, there is the need 
for a further study on China’s role and influence on Africa’s collective security 
arrangements.   
 
2 LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES 
  ECOWAS member states are limited in their ability to mobilize logistics 
resources to sustain a high level operational readiness required of a 
multinational force. There is generally poor Sea and Air-lift capabilities and lack 
of vital air-to-ground support asset. In cases where some logistics support is 
provided, the Force still suffers from the lack of standardization of equipment, 
 
29 Press Release, ECOWAS Bank and China to Establish Markets to Boost Trade and Investment, 
(http//news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=032&lang=en&annee=2008) 24 April 2008. 
30 S.A. Salim, “Preventive Diplomacy among African States,” Disarmament, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1990, pp 175- 190. 
S.G.Amoo “ Role of OAU: Past, Present and Future,” in DR Smock, Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign 
Intervention in Africa, Washington DC: USIP, 1993. 
12 
arms and ammunitions, thereby affecting interoperability. The lean resource 
base and low capacity of member states to provide the needed logistical support 
and in good timeframe, has resulted in delays in deployments or interventions.   
ECOWAS should adopt the wet lease system where countries provide 
equipment’s that meet a standardised minimum requirement in order to be 
reimbursed for the equipment.  
ECOWAS should have a standardised list of equipment that troop 
contributing countries should supply to their Units and troops serving with the 
ESF in order to receive reimbursement.   ECOWAS should also, provide 
guarantee for member states to purchase equipment for their Units and troops 
meant for the ESF and channel the reimbursement for these equipments to pay 
for the cost of the equipment.31 
 
3 FINANCIAL CHALLENGES 
Inadequate funding remains one of the major setbacks to the operational 
success of the ESF. ECOWAS has always been running into difficulties in funding 
its programmes without significant outside assistance. Most of the operational 
and training activities of ESF are heavily dependent on donor support from 
members of G8 and this could undermine the Force’s effectiveness.   
 Member states even fail to pay the community levy which                  
imposes 0.5% tax on non-ECOWAS imports as a means of generating funds 
internally. It is evident that ECOWAS need to develop new funding sources and 
member states should show more commitment to funding the ESF. 
 
4 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
The ECOWAS Protocol on regional collective security, which authorizes 
the use of force in dealing with Sub-regional conflicts, is at variance with 
provision of collective security by regional organization as contained in the UN 
Charter. The Charter provides that “no enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the 
UN Security Council.”32 Thus any departure from a peacekeeping to peace 
enforcement operations without UN authorization raises issues and the 
 
31 S.A. Salim, Ibid. 
32 UN Charter, chapter VII and VIII, New York: UN Press, 1992, pp 228-231. 
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possibility of a conflict with the UN, thus casting doubt over the legality of some 
ECOWAS operations.  
Institutionally also, there is no distinction between actions which the 
Authority of Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS may take and those 
that the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) could take under the   
Mechanism. The MSC can initiate and take actions on all policies for conflict 
prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, and security. Furthermore, 
the MSC is empowered to authorize all forms of intervention and decisions on 
employment of political and military solutions to threats to peace and security. It 
is also empowered to approve mandates for peacekeeping operations, and 
appoint the principal mission leadership.   In all these, the MSC is only required 
to keep the Authority of Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS informed 
of its actions and decisions. The Protocol however has no provision for the 
Authority of Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS to override the 
decisions of the MSC, should there be disagreement between the two. 
The MSC seems to have more powers than the Authority of Heads of States 
and Government the highest decision making body within ECOWAS. This is a 
major shortcoming of the ECOWAS Collective Security Mechanism. The 
beneficiary of a delegated power should be accountable to the benefactor.  The 
overall effect of these legal and institutional dimensions could undermine 
intervention efforts of the ESF. There is therefore the need to effectively 
coordinate partnership with all stakeholders and make the MSC accountable to 
the Authority of Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS. 
 
5 LACK OF POLITICAL WILL OF MEMBER STATES  
The advent of democracy and its high demands for accountability, have 
limited the freedom of action by Governments in committing troops and logistics 
resources to intervention operations. The requirement to justify one’s 
involvement in such operation in the face of other competing social demands at 
home discourages most Governments in getting involved easily in the ESF. Also 
the lean resource base and low capacity of member states has resulted in their 
selectivity in their response to conflicts in the Sub-region.  
The Anglophone-Francophone dichotomy arising from neo-colonialism 
has greatly affected the political will of member states in committing resources 
into the activities of the ESF. The need for the entire membership of ECOWAS to 
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champion a common supreme objective in the interest of peace and security of 
the sub region should be made paramount.   Additionally, ECOWAS should find 
innovative ways of making the ESF attractive to member states to enable them 
buy into it for the benefits they will derive from it. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Since the early 1990s till date, disputes and civil wars, with the attendant 
breakdown of law and order, and dire consequences for peace, security, and 
development, continue to plague the West Africa. The crises in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Guinea Bissau and most recently Cote D’ Ivore are vivid examples of such 
conflicts in the West African sub-region.  Some of the root causes of these 
conflicts have usually been traced to economic, social, environmental, religious 
and ethnic related factors. 
ECOWAS adopted the PNA and the PMAD as a basis for sub-regional 
conflict management.  The PMAD was to cater for the inadequacies of the PNA. 
The PMAD did not create a permanent ECOWAS standing Armed Force hence. 
ECOMOG had to rely on personnel contributed on a voluntary basis by some 
member-states. The existence of   the PNA and PMAD was a testimony that 
ECOWAS was not a purely economic integration outfit which could not assume 
responsibility for sub-regional conflict management.  Even though ECOWAS 
conflict management could best be describes as ad hoc and disjointed it 
transitioned well from an economic integration body to a conflict management 
body.  
ECOWAS in an attempt to deal with conflicts in the sub region used 
methods that could be termed unconventional which brought condemnation and 
criticism to the body.   It also created credibility issues and doubt about the 
ability of ECOMOG to handle sub regional conflicts.               
The ESF is to correct some of the problems ECOMOG had in both its 
organisation and operations.   The ESF is to solve some of the organisational and 
operational problems of ECOMOG. Since ECOWAS military vision, is anchored on 
the need to build and maintain a standby regional military capability, provides a 
clear direction for ECOWAS senior military commanders to develop a multi-
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